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LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES:  INCOME TAX TREATMENT
(Second of three parts)
— by Neil E. Harl*
In most instances, a major reason for forming limited
liability companies (LLCs) is to obtain the income tax
treatment of a partnership.1  Although the IRS rulings issued
to date generally support that outcome,2 careful attention is
needed in structuring an LLC to assure taxation as a
partnership.3
An LLC is treated as a partnership unless it has more
corporate than noncorporate characteristics.4 Thus, an LLC
must have no more than two of the following
characteristics—
•  Continuity of life (which LLCs generally do not
possess).5  The focus of the regulations is on whether any
member has the power to dissolve the entity under local law
upon voluntary or involuntary withdrawal.6  The Utah act,
for example, provides for continuation of the LLC on the
consent of members holding a majority of the profits
interest.7  This could cause problems of classification of the
entity as a partnership for federal income tax purposes.8  On
the other hand, if a state statute authorizes less than
unanimous consent but the entity has not opted for such a
provision, continuity of life may be lacking.9
•  Centralized management (which LLCs typically do not
possess).10  IRS has ruled that where the articles of
organization of the LLC provided that management was
reserved to the members (who were entitled to vote in
proportion to their interests in the LLC), and the members of
the LLC individually had the power to incur debts and
liabilities on behalf of the LLC under that state's LLC act, if
management was reserved to the members, centralized
management was lacking on the grounds that those powers
were similar to the powers of a general partner to bind all
partners.11
IRS has indicated that it will refuse to rule that
centralized management does not exist if limited partners
own more than 80 percent of the total interests in the
partnership.12  The ruling does not state, however, that a
favorable ruling will be issued if the general partners own 20
percent or more of the total interest in the partnership.  It is
not clear what relationship these authorities on limited
partnership classification bear to classification of LLCs.
•  Free transferability of interests (which LLCs typically
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do not possess).13  A member of an LLC generally can
assign or transfer that member's interest to another person
who is not a member of the organization.14  However, the
assignee or transferee typically does not become a substitute
member and does not acquire all of the attributes of the
member's interest in the LLC unless all of the remaining
members approve the assignment or transfer.15  Therefore,
LLCs usually lack the corporate characteristic of free
transferability of interests.  This is essential for partnership
tax status.16
In the event the remaining members fail to approve the
assignment, or transfer, the assignee or transferee has no
right to participate in the management or become a member
of the limited liability company.  However, the assignee or
transferee is entitled to receive the share of profits or other
compensation and the return of contributions to which the
transferring member would otherwise be entitled.17
•  Limited liability (which LLCs possess).18
LLCs are conceded to have associates and an objective
of carrying on a business and dividing the gains from the
business.  Of the remaining four characteristics, LLCs
generally possess only limited liability.  Thus, LLCs should
generally be classified as a partnership for federal income
tax purposes.  Note, however, that even though classified as
a partnership for federal income tax purposes an LLC may
be subject to state corporate income tax in some states.19
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 8 Harl, Agricultural Law § 61.03 (1993).
2 E.g., Rev. Rul. 93-30, I.R.B. 1993-16, 4.
3 Rev. Rul. 93-38, I.R.B. 1993-21, 4, see p. 98 supra.
4 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1).  See Larson v. Comm’r, 66
T.C. 159 (1976), acq., 1977-1 C.B. 1.
5 E.g., Rev. Rul. 93-30, I.R.B. 1993-16, 4; Rev. Rul. 93-5, I.R.B.
1993-3; Rev. Rul. 93-6, I.R.B. 1993-3; Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2
C.B. 360; Ltr. Rul. 9320045, Feb. 24, 1993.
6 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3).
7 Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-137.
8 See Ltr. Rul. 9010027, Mar. 19, 1990.
9 See Ltr. Rul. 8937010, Oct. 25, 1989 (Florida law); Ltr. Rul.
9029019, July 25, 1990 (Texas law).
10 E.g., n. 5 supra.
11 Ltr. Rul. 9010027, Mar. 19, 1990; Ltr. Rul. 9320045, Feb. 24,
1993.
12 Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, amplified by Rev. Proc. 91-
13, 1991-1 C.B. 477.
13 E.g., n. 5 supra.
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*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
14 E.g., Iowa Code § 490A.902.
15 Id.
16 See Rev. Rul. 93-30, I.R.B. 1993-16, 4; Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-
2 C.B. 360.
17 E.g., Iowa Code § 490A.902.
18 E.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86.371.  See n. 5 supra.
19 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.471.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
CONSOLIDATION. The debtor filed a Chapter 11 case
in 1990 and the debtor’s wholly-owned farm corporation
filed for Chapter 11 in 1992. The debtor moved for
substantive consolidation of the cases. The court held that
consolidation was untimely because no evidence was
available to determine the effect on the creditors in each
case. In re Stevenson, 153 B.R. 52 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1993).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03.*
HOMESTEAD. The debtors owned two neighboring
buildings which they rented as four apartments and used the
fifth apartment as their residence. The court held that the
debtors could claim a homestead exemption only as to the
portion of the buildings used as their personal residence. In
re Wierschem, 152 B.R. 345 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
LIFE INSURANCE. The debtor was the surviving
spouse of a person who had five life insurance policies, all
of which named the surviving spouse as beneficiary; two
had been assigned to the surviving spouse by the decedent,
two were owned by the decedent and one was owned by the
decedent's corporation. The court held that under N.Y. Ins.
Law § 3212(b), the proceeds of the policies assigned to the
surviving spouse were exempt but the other policies were
not exempt. In re Rundlett, 153 B.R. 126 (S.D. N.Y.
1993), aff’g, 142 B.R. 649 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1992).
TAX REFUND. At the time of the bankruptcy filing, the
IRS held $12,000 of excess taxes owed to the debtors as a
refund. The debtors claimed that the refund was exempt
under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 513.427 because the refund was not
subject to attachment. The court held that under I.R.C. §
6402, the refund was subject to attachment in specific
instances, although not by any current creditor of the
debtors; therefore, the refund was not eligible for the
exemption. In re Robinson, 152 B.R. 956 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1993).
The debtor sought to exempt as wages federal and state
income tax refunds resulting from taxes withheld from the
debtor’s wages during the 90 days prior to filing for
bankruptcy. The court held that the refunds were not
“wages” for purposes of the exemption statute, Okla. Stat.
tit. 31 § 1(A)(18). In re Miles, 153 B.R. 72 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1993).
WILD CARD. The debtor’s fax machine, copier, office
desk and chair, and file cabinet used in the debtor’s business
were eligible for the tools of the trade exemption to the
extent of the dollar limit of that exemption, with any excess
amount eligible for the “wild card” exemption. The debtor’s
bank account was not eligible for the tools of the trade
exemption and was not eligible for the “wild card”
exemption. In re King, 153 B.R. 229 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1993).
    CHAPTER 12
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[8][c].* The Chapter 12 plan
was not confirmed where the plan failed to include (1)
payment of trustee fees on impaired claims paid by the
debtor directly, (2) a source of operating funds for restarting
the debtor’s dairy and livestock operations, and (3) several
expense items. In re Oster, 152 B.R. 960 (Bankr. D. N.D.
1993).
Although the debtor’s spouse did not join in the
bankruptcy case, the debtor’s plan included the spouse’s
nonfarm income in the amount of  income available to meet
farm expenses. A creditor objected to the plan, arguing that
the nondebtor spouse’s income is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the spouse cannot
be legally forced to contribute to the debtor’s plan
payments. The court held that the plan would be confirmed.
The court noted that the court is also powerless to force the
debtor to make plan payments; therefore, the court’s
inability to force the debtor’s spouse to contribute income to
the plan payments did not affect the confirmability of the
plan.  In both cases, the result of a failure to pay would be a
default under the plan with the only remedy being denial of
discharge.  In re Soper, 152 B.R. 985 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1993).
The Chapter 12 debtor’s plan provided that stock in a
Farm Credit Bank would be transferred to the bank in partial
satisfaction of a secured claim of the bank. The bank
objected to the plan, arguing that the stock could not be
redeemed without permission of the bank. The court held
that Section 1225(a)(5)(C) has precedence over the Farm
Credit Bank regulations and that the redemption of the stock
could be required by the plan. In re Davenport, 153 B.R.
551 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993).
TRUSTEE FEES-ALM § 13.03[8][b].* The debtor’s
Chapter 12 plan was confirmed in 1989 and included a
trustee fee of 6 percent. The trustee sought an increase in the
fee to 10 percent in 1992 after the statutory fee was
increased by order of the U.S. Attorney General. The court
held that the fee could not be increased because (1) the
trustee had not demonstrated that the debtor could make the
payments with the increase in fees, (2) the trustee failed to
show that the modification of the fee was proper, and (3) the
confirmed plan was res judicata as to the trustee fee. In re
Roesner, 153 B.R. 328 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
ATTORNEY’S FEES. Although the court held that the
IRS was not deemed to have waived sovereign immunity for
purposes of awarding attorney’s fees and costs resulting
from repeated violations of the discharge order, the court
